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Philosophical	Studies:	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1223-3)	
 	 		What	could	ground	normative	restrictions	concerning	cultural	appropriation	which	are	not	grounded	by	independent	considerations	such	as	property	rights	or	harm?	We	propose	that	such	restrictions	can	be	grounded	by	considerations	of	intimacy.	Consider	the	familiar	phenomenon	of	interpersonal	intimacy.	Certain	aspects	of	personal	life	and	interpersonal	relationships	are	afforded	various	protections	in	virtue	of	being	intimate.	We	argue	that	an	analogous	phenomenon	exists	at	the	level	of	large	groups.	In	many	cases,	members	of	a	group	engage	in	shared	practices	that	contribute	to	a	sense	of	common	identity,	such	as	wearing	certain	hair	or	clothing	styles	or	performing	a	certain	style	of	music.	Participation	in	such	practices	can	generate	relations	of	group	intimacy,	which	can	ground	certain	prerogatives	in	much	the	same	way	that	interpersonal	intimacy	can.	One	such	prerogative	is	making	what	we	call	an	appropriation	claim.	An	appropriation	claim	is	a	request	from	a	group	member	that	non-members	refrain	from	appropriating	a	given	element	of	the	group’s	culture.	Ignoring	appropriation	claims	can	constitute	a	breach	of	intimacy.	But,	we	argue,	just	as	for	the	prerogatives	of	interpersonal	intimacy,	in	many	cases	there	is	no	prior	fact	of	the	matter	about	whether	the	appropriation	of	a	given	cultural	practice	constitutes	a	breach	of	intimacy.	It	depends	on	what	the	group	decides	together.					 The	popular	debate	over	cultural	appropriation	tends	to	polarize	around	two	positions.	At	one	extreme	is	universal	entitlement:	the	view	that	anybody	may	appropriate	anything	they	like	from	other	cultures	within	the	boundaries	of	property	law,	including	musical	styles,	hair	styles,	and	religious	dress.	Defenders	of	this	view	often	cite	the	value	of	cultural	interchange	and	freedom	of	expression,	and	claim	that	more	restrictive	views	are	stifling	to	art,	speech,	and	culture.	On	the	other	extreme	is	universal	restrictiveness:	the	view	that	cultural	appropriation	from	marginalized	groups	is	impermissible.	Defenders	of	this	view	cite	the	vulnerability	of	marginalized	groups	and	the	fact	that	appropriation	typically	benefits	the	dominant	group	rather	than	the	marginalized	
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group.	We	take	both	of	these	extreme	positions	to	underestimate	the	complexity	of	the	issue.	The	goal	of	this	paper	is	to	chart	a	middle	path,	which	will	integrate	considerations	from	both	sides.1			 Much	of	the	academic	discussion	of	cultural	appropriation	has	focused	on	the	appropriation	of	unique	physical	objects.2	Questions	about	this	sort	of	appropriation	hinge	on	issues	of	property	rights.	Outside	of	the	academy,	the	contemporary	debate	over	cultural	appropriation	has	been	primarily	concerned	with	cases	that	do	not	appear	to	be	analyzable	in	terms	of	property	rights.	A	major	focal	point	of	this	debate	has	been	the	phenomenon	of	style	appropriation—that	is,	the	use	of	stylistic	cultural	innovations	distinctive	of	one	culture	by	members	of	another	culture,	including	hairstyles,	fashion,	cooking	techniques,	musical	styles,	and	slang.3	What	could	ground	normative	restrictions	concerning	style	appropriation,	given	that	it	does	not	appear	to	involve	the	violation	of	property	rights?		 We	propose	that	in	many	cases,	such	restrictions	can	be	grounded	by	considerations	of	
intimacy.	Consider	the	familiar	phenomenon	of	interpersonal	intimacy.	Certain	aspects	of	personal	life	and	interpersonal	relationships	are	afforded	various	protections	in	virtue	of	being	intimate.	It	would	in	many	cases	be	considered	an	unacceptable	breach	of	intimacy,	for	example,	to	read	someone	else’s	love	letters.	Crucially,	the	protections	afforded	by	interpersonal	intimacy	can	be	insisted	upon	or	waived	by	the	participants	in	an	intimate	relationship.	A	couple	may	decide	to	keep	their	love	letters	entirely	private,	or	they	may	decide	to	read	the	letters	to	a	close	circle	of	
                                                        
1 The term “cultural appropriation” is often used pejoratively; our usage is neutral. We prefer this valence-neutral 
usage because it accommodates without a proliferation of terminology the possibility that some forms of 
appropriation are ambiguous, unproblematic, or even laudable. See, for instance, Andrea Walsh’s and Dominic 
Lopes’s very useful account of the laudable re-appropriation of racist colonial imagery by First Nations artists 
(Walsh and Lopes 2009).  
2 For example, in the most recent philosophical anthology on cultural appropriation, the majority of essays take up 
questions of physical appropriation of physical remains and archeological finds, or slightly more esoteric forms of 
property ownership – such as ownership of genetic information, or intellectual property (Young and Brunk 2012). 
3 James Young discusses other types of appropriation, including content appropriation, which involves borrowing 
the content of artistic works, stories or myths of another culture (Young 2010, 6). Young also discusses what he 
calls ‘subject appropriation’, which involves adopting another culture or group as subject matter. For example, a 
white American author engages in subject appropriation when they write a book from the point of view of a Black 
African character. We take this to be a distinct phenomenon and don’t explore it directly in this paper. We do think, 
however, that our account would be a promising starting point for an analysis of the norms surrounding subject 
appropriation.   
 3 
friends,	or	they	may	publish	them	for	the	world	to	see.	The	permissibility	of	reading	a	couple’s	love	letters	hinges	on	what	the	romantic	partners	decide	together	about	whether	others	may	read	it.			 We	argue	that	an	analogous	phenomenon	exists	at	the	level	of	large	groups.	In	many	cases,	members	of	a	group	engage	in	shared	practices	that	contribute	to	a	sense	of	common	identity,	such	as	wearing	certain	hair	or	clothing	styles	or	performing	a	certain	style	of	music.	Participation	in	such	practices	can	generate	relations	of	group	intimacy,	which	can	ground	certain	prerogatives	in	much	the	same	way	that	interpersonal	intimacy	can.	One	such	prerogative	is	making	what	we	call	an	appropriation	claim.	An	appropriation	claim	is	a	request	from	a	group	member	that	non-members	refrain	from	appropriating	a	given	element	of	the	group’s	culture.	Ignoring	appropriation	claims	can	constitute	a	breach	of	intimacy.	But,	we	argue,	just	as	for	the	prerogatives	of	interpersonal	intimacy,	in	some	cases	there	is	no	prior	fact	of	the	matter	about	whether	the	appropriation	of	a	given	cultural	practice	constitutes	a	breach	of	intimacy.	It	depends	on	what	the	group	decides	together.	One	group	may	decide	that	it	very	much	objects	to	outsiders	appropriating	its	religious	musical	style,	while	another	group	may	permit	or	actively	encourage	such	appropriation	by	outsiders.	In	the	first	case	appropriation	would	constitute	a	breach	of	intimacy,	whereas	in	the	second	case	it	would	not.						 We	proceed	in	four	stages.	In	section	1,	we	discuss	the	varieties	of	appropriation	claims	that	are	frequently	made	and	the	arguments	that	are	offered	to	support	them.		We	argue	that	many	appropriation	claims	are	expressive	in	nature	and	that	further	explanation	is	needed	as	to	why	such	claims	have	normative	significance.	In	section	2,	we	give	an	account	of	the	way	in	which	considerations	about	interpersonal	intimacy	can	have	normative	significance	and	argue	that	this	account	can	plausibly	be	extended	to	the	case	of	group	intimacy.	In	section	3,	we	consider	the	normative	implications	of	the	intimacy	account.	We	argue	that	the	intimacy	account	supports	a	context-dependent	normative	outlook	and	militates	against	the	extreme	positions	in	either	
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direction.	In	section	4,	we	consider	problems	for	the	intimacy	account	and	suggest	directions	for	further	research.					
Section	1:	Preliminaries		 There	is	a	complex	debate	underway	about	cultural	appropriation,	manifested	in	the	thousands	of	think	pieces,	blog	posts,	editorials,	tweets,	and	academic	papers	concerning	the	topic	that	have	been	published	over	the	last	several	years.	The	arguments	commonly	offered	to	support	appropriation	claims	can	be	divided	roughly	into	three	categories:		
• Arguments	based	on	the	harmfulness	of	cultural	appropriation	(harm	arguments)	
• Arguments	based	on	the	objectionable	symbolism	of	cultural	appropriation	(objectionable	symbolism	arguments)	
• Arguments	holding	that	appropriation	claims	by	members	of	the	relevant	group—regardless	of	justification—generate	a	sufficient	reason	not	to	appropriate	(claim	deference	arguments)	
We	distinguish	between	two	types	of	appropriation	claims:	expressive	and	independently	grounded.	An	expressive	claim	expresses	the	wish	of	a	group	member	that	outsiders	refrain	from	appropriating	a	given	cultural	element,	and	need	not	cite	a	rationale.	Independently	grounded	appropriation	claims,	on	the	other	hand,	identify	an	independent	rationale	for	others	abstaining	from	the	relevant	form	of	appropriation.	There	are	analogous	types	of	claims	elsewhere	in	the	normative	world.		“Please	don’t	touch	me,”	is	an	expressive	claim	–	the	very	fact	that	I	don’t	want	you	to	touch	me	and	have	said	so	grounds	its	normative	force.	One	need	not	offer	a	rationale	to	support	such	a	claim	or	to	ground	its	normative	force.	On	the	other	hand,	“Physical	contact	gives	me	hives,	so	you	shouldn’t	touch	me”	is	an	independently	grounded	claim.	It	reports	a	fact	independent	
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of	the	claim	itself	that	grounds	its	normative	force.	An	independently	grounded	claim	stands	or	falls	with	its	rationale.	If	the	rationale	could	be	debunked,	the	claimant	should	abandon	the	claim.	An	expressive	claim,	on	the	other	hand,	stands	without	need	for	a	rationale.	One	can	deny	that	an	expressive	claim	has	normative	weight,	but	its	expressive	content	does	not	normally	admit	of	direct	contestation.	One	can	deny	that	someone’s	wish	not	to	be	touched	has	normative	force,	for	instance,	but	it	would	normally	be	out	of	place	to	deny	that	the	person	in	fact	wishes	not	to	be	touched.		The	first	type	of	argument	given	in	support	of	cultural	appropriation	claims	is	based	in	considerations	of	harm.	Claims	supported	by	such	arguments	are	the	clearest	examples	of	independently	grounded	appropriation	claims.	Harm	arguments	hold	that	some	forms	of	cultural	appropriation	cause	harm	to	members	of	the	culture	that	is	being	appropriated	from.	These	arguments	typically	deploy	the	premise	that	historical	oppression	has	rendered	some	groups	particularly	vulnerable	to	being	harmed	through	cultural	appropriation.	A	wide	variety	of	potential	harms	are	often	cited,	including	the	promotion	of	harmful	stereotypes,4	the	dilution	or	erasure	of	important	cultural	practices,5	epistemic	injustice,6	intellectual	property	theft,7	the	taking	of	economic	opportunities	that	are	thereby	closed	off	to	cultural	insiders,8	and	even	the	annihilation	of	the	group.9	We	do	not	doubt	that	such	arguments	often	identify	genuine	harms.	For	instance,	it	is	clear	that	appropriating	from	marginalized	groups	in	a	way	that	negatively	stereotypes	them	can	play	a	causal	role	in	perpetuating	or	worsening	oppression.	On	a	case	by	case	basis,	if	a	form	of	
                                                        
4 https://www.thoughtco.com/cultural-appropriation-and-why-its-wrong-2834561; discussed in (Young 2010, 107-
113). 
5 Baraka on cultural genocide discussed in (Gracyk 2001, 113) and (Young 2010, 118-120). 
6 (Matthes 2016). 
7 See “Of Seeds and Shamans” and “Native American Intellectual Property Rights: Issues in the Control of Esoteric 
Knowledge” in (Ziff and Rao 1997).  
8 See Briahna Joy Gray on cultural exploitation: https://www.currentaffairs.org/2017/09/the-question-of-cultural-
appropriation. Also: https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/03/22/471309991/when-chefs-become-famous-
cooking-other-cultures-food; discussed in (Young 2010, 114-118). 
9 Elizabeth Coleman argues for restrictions against use by outsiders of certain images from aboriginal paintings. 
Such images, says Coleman, can count as insignias, which have an essential social function, much like heraldic 
devices or official stamps. Such insignias can only perform their social function when their use is restricted to 
authorized persons. In the cases of highly threatened groups, such as aboriginal groups, the uncontrolled use of such 
insignias threatens the stability and survivability of the group (Coleman 2001). 
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appropriation	can	be	shown	to	likely	cause	harm,	then	that	fact	has	normative	significance	and	should	be	weighed	accordingly.10	But	appropriation	claims	are	often	made	in	the	absence	of	evidence	of	harm.	Thus,	harm	arguments	are	only	able	to	ground	a	limited	range	of	claims.	What	might	ground	an	appropriation	claim,	even	in	the	absence	of	evidence	of	harm?				 The	second	type	of	argument	given	in	support	of	appropriation	claims	is	what	we	call	an	‘objectionable	symbolism	argument’.	Objectionable	symbolism	arguments	hold	that	when	a	group	is	suffering	under	oppressive	power	structures,	members	of	dominant	groups	should	avoid	appropriating	from	the	oppressed	group	in	a	manner	that	draws	attention	to	the	power	imbalance	and	the	way	it	benefits	the	appropriator.	For	example,	take	the	case	of	dreadlocks.	Black	Americans	face	a	systematic	disadvantage	on	the	labor	market.	In	order	to	meet	norms	of	respectability,	they	are	under	pressure	not	to	wear	hairstyles	that	signal	Blackness.11	But	white	people	can	appropriate	Black	hairstyles	and	be	seen	as	“cool”	or	“edgy”	while	still	enjoying	a	variety	of	social	and	economic	advantages.	It	is	seen	as	distinctly	unfair	for	members	of	an	advantaged	group	to	benefit	in	this	manner	from	the	cultural	innovations	of	the	oppressed.	This	sense	of	unfairness	cannot	plausibly	be	analyzed	in	terms	of	the	property	rights	of	the	group	being	appropriated	from.	A	group	cannot	own	a	hairstyle.	The	offending	unfairness	lies	rather	in	the	background	power	dynamics	that	are	symbolically	enacted	by	cultural	appropriation.12	A	white	person	wearing	dreadlocks	can	be	interpreted	by	a	Black	onlooker	as	symbolically	enacting	the	dynamics	of	white	privilege.		In	this	case,	white	people	use	Black	cultural	innovations	as	fashion	accents	with	impunity	while	Black	people	who	display	such	indicators	are	denied	social	respect	and	economic	opportunity.			 Another	example	is	the	sale	of	imitation	Native	American	war	bonnets	as	fashion	accessories	by	retailers	such	as	Urban	Outfitters.	Many	Native	American	commentators	have	found	
                                                        
10 Cf. (Young 2010, 153).  
11 http://www.blackenterprise.com/career/dreadlocks-ban-corporate-success-stories/ 
12 See Briahna Joy Gray on cultural disrespect: https://www.currentaffairs.org/2017/09/the-question-of-cultural-
appropriation 
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the	symbolism	of	this	practice	severely	objectionable.13	War	bonnets	have	special	cultural	meaning,	and	are	traditionally	only	worn	by	highly	respected	individuals	who	have	earned	the	privilege	of	wearing	them.	When	a	white	person	wears	an	imitation	war	bonnet	as	a	fashion	accessory,	a	Native	American	onlooker	might	take	their	appropriation	to	symbolically	enact	the	dynamics	of	colonialism,	because	it	is	a	further	instance	of	white	people	taking	from	Natives	without	permission.	White	Europeans	invaded	North	America,	ignored	treaties	and	inflicted	atrocities	for	hundreds	of	years,	created	conditions	where	Native	Americans	face	systematic	disadvantages,	and	now	add	insult	to	injury	by	appropriating	a	garment	that	has	special	meaning	for	many	tribes	despite	objections	from	tribal	members.			 We	find	it	plausible	that	considerations	of	objectionable	symbolism	can	sometimes	be	the	basis	for	independently	grounded	appropriation	claims.	As	philosopher	James	Young	has	argued,	this	is	especially	true	for	cases	where	appropriation	causes	profound	offense.14	By	‘profound	offense,’	Young	means	that	which	is	offensive	to	one’s	moral	sensibilities.15	He	thinks	that	when	an	act	is	widely	found	to	be	profoundly	offensive,	this	provides	a	prima	facie	reason	to	believe	that	it	is	morally	wrong.16	On	his	account,	these	reasons	are	decisive	in	cases	of	appropriation	where	members	of	the	relevant	group	widely	agree	that	the	act	is	profoundly	offensive	and	where	there	are	no	sufficiently	strong	countervailing	considerations.17	Young	cites	as	examples	murals	in	the	Parliament	Buildings	in	Victoria,	British	Columbia	by	George	Southwell.18	One	of	these	murals	depicts	a	bare-breasted	indigenous	woman	working	on	the	construction	of	Fort	Victoria,	while	another,	titled	Justice,	depicts	an	indigenous	person	arraigned	before	a	colonial	judge.	We	think	that	claims	concerning	such	extreme	cases	could	count	as	independently	grounded,	even	bracketing	considerations	of	harm.	Southwell’s	murals	are	so	clearly	objectionable	because	the	meaning	of	the	
                                                        
13 http://nativeappropriations.com/2010/04/but-why-cant-i-wear-a-hipster-headdress.html 
14 (Young 2010, 129-151).  
15 (Young 2010, 130). 
16 (Young 2010, 134).  
17 (Young 2010, 146).  
18 (Young 2010, 131).  
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symbols	is	fixed	by	the	historical	context.19	There	is	no	available	interpretation	of	these	symbols	that	is	not	profoundly	offensive.			 The	majority	of	cases,	however,	are	not	nearly	so	clear;	most	symbols	and	symbolic	acts	are	open	to	a	range	of	interpretations.	In	many	cases,	an	act	of	appropriation	could	be	taken	to	be	objectionable,	but	group	members	do	not	in	fact	find	it	to	be	objectionable.	Consider,	for	instance,	David	Bowie’s	influential	take	on	soul	music.	This	act	of	appropriation	and	its	resounding	popularity	could	be	interpreted	as	objectionably	enacting	the	dynamics	of	white	hegemony,	but	could	also	be	celebrated	as	a	mutually	beneficial	cultural	exchange,	as	it	has	been	by	those	Black	writers	who	point	to	Bowie	as	an	exemplar	of	how	to	borrow	from	other	cultures	without	causing	offense.20	Consider,	also,	divides	in	the	Indian	community	over	the	appropriation	of	the	sari:	some	view	it	as	insulting;	others	celebrate	it	as	signaling	the	mainstreaming	of	Indian	culture.21	We	therefore	think	that	many	appropriation	claims	based	on	objectionable	symbolism	arguments	are	best	understood	as	expressive	rather	than	independently	grounded.	In	such	cases,	it	is	not	the	free-standing	fact	that	an	act	of	appropriation	could	be	interpreted	in	an	objectionable	way	that	matters,	but	rather	what	matters	is	that	group	members	in	fact	find	it	objectionable.	Appropriation	claims	of	this	sort	express	the	wishes	of	group	members	that	outsiders	refrain	from	a	form	of	appropriation	that	they	find	objectionable.	These	are,	on	our	taxonomy,	expressive	claims.				 This	brings	us	to	the	third	type	of	anti-appropriation	argument	that	has	frequently	been	made:	claim	deference.	Adrienne	Keene,	a	professor	of	Native	American	studies,	articulates	a	claim	deference	argument	on	her	blog	Native	Appropriations:		But	the	thing	that	keeps	bothering	me	is	that	we’re	expected,	as	community	members,	to	have	perfectly	reasoned,	calm,	point-by-point	rebuttals	to	your	image	and	words.	The	burden	of	proof	is	on	us,	not	you.	Why	can’t	we,	as	the	cultures	you’re	“respecting”	simply	say	“no”?	Why	do	we	have	to	defend	and	fight	and	write	1400	words	about	why,	and	then	listen	while	others	mock	our	pain	and	
                                                        
19 For an excellent general treatment of this idea, see the discussion of incorrigible social meanings in (Patridge 
2011, 307-9). 
20 http://www.theroot.com/how-david-bowie-inspired-and-was-inspired-by-black-arti-1790853923; 
http://www.highsnobiety.com/2016/07/11/cultural-appropriation-justin-timberlake/. 
21 https://www.xojane.com/issues/my-indian-parents-are-fans-of-cultural-appropriation?page=586 
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hurt	as	being	“overly	sensitive”?	Why	can’t	you	show	us	respect	by	just	listening	to	us	when	we	say,	“Hey	Christina,	that	headdress?	It’s	not	for	you	to	wear.”		Keene	thinks	that,	at	least	in	the	case	of	oppressed	groups	such	as	Native	Americans,	no	justification	for	an	appropriation	claim	should	be	required	aside	from	the	claim	itself.	By	definition,	such	appropriation	claims	are	expressive	rather	than	independently	grounded,	since	the	wishes	of	the	claimant	are	taken	to	generate	a	prescription	to	refrain	from	the	relevant	form	of	appropriation	without	reference	to	an	independent	justification.	Keene	argues	that	the	burden	of	proof	shouldn't	be	on	members	of	oppressed	groups.	If	members	of	such	groups	don’t	want	outsiders	appropriating	some	element	of	their	culture,	then—she	claims—that	should	be	enough.		 Our	primary	concern	with	claim	deference	is	that	it	does	not	appropriately	respect	the	agency	of	group	members	who	disagree	with	appropriation	claimants.	Imagine,	for	instance,	that	a	small	but	vocal	set	of	group	members	issue	forceful	appropriation	claims	regarding	a	certain	cultural	element,	while	the	majority	of	the	group	is	actively	in	favor	of	outsiders	appropriating	the	cultural	element	in	question.	In	cases	like	this,	simply	deferring	to	appropriation	claims	without	attending	to	dissenting	voices	discounts	the	agency	of	a	great	many	legitimate	stakeholders.				 Consider	the	controversy	that	erupted	in	2015	concerning	a	kimono-themed	exhibit	at	Boston’s	Museum	of	Fine	Art.	The	exhibit	was	originally	developed	in	Japan	by	the	Japanese	public	broadcasting	corporation	NHK,	but	was	later	displayed	in	Boston	with	NHK’s	cooperation.22	The	exhibit	featured	Claude	Monet’s	painting,	La	Japonaise,	which	depicts	his	wife	Camille	wearing	a	kimono.	The	painting	is	generally	taken	to	be	a	comment	on	French	fascination	with	Japanese	culture.	NHK	provided	the	museum	with	a	set	of	kimonos	they	had	previously	commissioned	for	the	original	Japanese	exhibit	and	visitors	were	invited	to	try	on	a	kimono	and	pose	in	front	of	the	painting.	Shortly	after	the	exhibit	began,	a	small,	multi-ethnic	group	of	protestors	began	standing	in	
                                                        
22 https://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/style/2015/07/07/mfa-backs-down -over-kimono-event-response-
protests/lv9NHcnpW0lsRE77d9hvkI/story.htm 
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front	of	the	painting	with	signs	denouncing	the	exhibit	as	objectionable	cultural	appropriation.23	The	protests	made	headlines	and	soon	a	group	of	Japanese	counter-protesters	joined	the	fray	to	defend	the	exhibit.24	The	counter-protestors	wore	kimonos	and	held	signs	that	read,	for	instance,	“I	am	a	Japanese	language	teacher,	and	I	welcome	exhibits	that	share	Japanese	culture	with	the	community.”25	According	to	Julie	Valk’s	analysis,	a	multi-ethnic	alliance	concerned	to	combat	western	appropriation	of	Asian	culture	in	general	attempted	to	assert	an	appropriation	claim	regarding	the	kimono,	but	a	group	of	Japanese-Americans	disagreed	and	actively	came	out	in	favor	the	kimono	exhibit.26	The	original	protesters	were	successful	in	provoking	the	museum	to	stop	letting	visitors	try	on	kimonos.	Even	supposing	that	these	protesters	included	at	least	some	Japanese-Americans,	we	think	it	is	problematic	for	these	few	individuals	(let	alone	their	non-Japanese	allies)	to	effectively	have	veto	power	over	the	Japanese	organizers	of	the	event	and	the	Japanese	counter-protesters	who	defended	it.	Claim	deference	effectively	affords	the	most	restrictive	voices	within	a	group	the	power	to	overrule	the	rest	of	the	group,	and	thereby	objectionably	limits	the	agency	of	group	members	who	do	not	share	the	most	restrictive	viewpoint.	We	are	not	here	claiming	that	the	kimonos	should	or	should	not	have	been	displayed	–	only	that	it	is	a	problematic	procedure	for	outsiders	to	effectively	act	as	arbiters	of	a	disagreement	internal	to	a	group	by	automatically	deferring	to	the	more	restrictive	contingent.				 Although	we	think	that	claim	deference	is	too	strong,	we	will	propose	another,	more	equitable	route	to	grounding	the	normative	importance	of	expressive	appropriation	claims.	In	what	follows,	we	argue	that	expressive	appropriation	claims	can	be	analyzed	in	terms	of	group	intimacy	and	the	prerogatives	it	grounds.		
                                                        
23 https://www.bostonglobe.com/arts/2015/07/18/counter-protesters-join-kimono-fray-
mfa/ZgVWiT3yIZSlQgxCghAOFM/story.html 
24 Ibid. 
25 https://whyevolutionistrue.files.wordpress.com/2016/02/img_0935.jpg 
26 (Valk 2015).  
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Section	2:	The	intimacy	account	In	this	section,	we	present	an	account	of	the	normative	importance	of	expressive	appropriation	claims	that	centers	on	the	concept	of	intimacy.	We	first	present	an	account	of	group	intimacy,	and	then	we	argue	that	expressive	appropriation	claims	can	best	be	understood	as	asserting	boundaries	of	group	intimacy.			 Let’s	begin	by	considering	the	most	familiar	form	of	intimacy:	intimacy	between	individuals,	which	we	call	interpersonal	intimacy.	This	is	the	sort	of	intimacy	that	exists	between,	for	example,	romantic	couples.	Crucially,	this	form	of	intimacy	is	ordinarily	taken	to	sufficiently	ground	a	variety	of	prerogatives.	Thi	Nguyen	and	his	spouse	have	odd	pet	names	for	each	other,	and	a	funny	dance	that	they	do	when	one	of	them	is	sad.	Are	their	friends	allowed	to	witness,	use	and	transmit	those	pet	names	and	that	funny	dance?	There	is	no	independently	grounded	fact	of	the	matter;	it	simply	depends	on	where	the	couple	decides	the	boundary	should	be.	Once	the	boundary	has	been	set,	it	generates	normative	constraints	for	others.	If	Thi	and	his	spouse	do	not	want	their	friends	to	use	their	pet	names,	then	their	friends	shouldn’t	use	them.	There	is	one	important	caveat:	in	order	for	intimacy	to	ground	such	prerogatives,	the	intimate	practices	in	question	must	be	sufficiently	distinct	from	pre-existing	practices.	If	the	funny	little	dance	that	Thi	and	his	wife	do	for	each	other	is	the	Electric	Slide,	they	don’t	have	any	say	over	whether	or	not	their	friends	can	perform	it.					 Intimacy	has	received	relatively	scant	philosophical	treatment,	despite	its	evident	importance.27	Perhaps	the	most	robust	philosophical	account	of	intimacy	to	date	is	Julie	Inness’	analysis	of	intimacy	and	its	relationship	to	the	right	to	privacy.	She	points	out	that	what	the	right	to	privacy	protects	is	heterogeneous;	it	pertains	to	the	distribution	of	personal	information,	access	to	persons	and	bodies,	and	autonomy	in	decision-making.	The	only	thing	that	might	plausibly	unite	and	explain	all	the	sorts	of	things	protected	under	the	right	to	privacy,	she	argues,	is	the	concept	of	
                                                        
27 Ted Cohen’s work on intimacy, especially as it relates to humor, is an important exception, and the indirect 
inspiration for our account (Cohen 1978, 1999). However, his account does not discuss the normative consequences 
of intimacy, and so is not directly relevant to our argument.  
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intimacy.	Intimate	acts,	on	her	account,	are	those	that	draw	their	meaning	and	value	from	the	agent’s	
motivational	state	of	loving,	liking,	or	caring	for.	28	In	her	example,	if	someone	shared	some	old	love	letters	with	you	and	did	so	as	a	way	of	embodying	their	love	for	you,	then	that	sharing	is	intimate.	What	matters	is	the	motivational	state,	not	the	type	of	action	taken.	One	might	show	someone	old	love	letters	for	a	variety	of	reasons:	perhaps	for	the	sake	of	revenge,	or	because	one	was	paid	an	enormous	amount	by	a	gossip	columnist.	If	the	sharing	is	not	meant	to	express	loving,	liking,	or	caring	for,	then	it	does	not	count	as	intimate.29	Her	account	is	intended	to	explain	interpersonal	intimacy,	but	we	suggest	that	it	points	to	a	promising	way	of	understanding	group	intimacy.	For	Inness,	what	makes	an	act	intimate	is	that	it	expresses	an	agent’s	loving,	liking	or	caring	for	another	person	and	thereby	has	special	meaning	and	value	for	the	agent.	We	propose	that,	in	the	case	of	larger	groups,	what	makes	a	practice	intimate	is	that	it	functions	to	embody	or	promote	a	sense	of	common	identity	and	group	connection	among	participants	in	the	practice,	and	thereby	renders	it	meaningful	and	valuable	to	these	participants.	Intimate	groups	are	groups	bound	together	by	such	practices.	We	do	not	mean	to	imply	that	intimacy	shared	among	larger	groups	works	precisely	the	way	intimacy	works	within	families	or	between	couples,	nor	do	we	mean	to	imply	that	every	member	of	an	intimate	group	stands	in	a	relation	of	interpersonal	intimacy	to	every	other	member	of	the	group.	Rather,	we	propose	that	there	is	type	of	relation	that	exists	at	the	scale	of	large	groups	that	is	analogous	to	intimacy	among	couples	or	within	families.	Group	intimacy	does	not	entail	that	the	members	of	the	group	all	know	each	other	or	spend	time	around	each	other.	Rather,	it	entails	that	the	group	is	bound	together	by	common	practices	that	ground	a	sense	of	unity	shared	by	members	of	the	group.			 Our	proposal	is	that,	in	much	the	same	way	as	familial	or	romantic	intimacy	can	ground	the	right	to	privacy,	intimacy	enjoyed	by	larger	groups	can	ground	certain	prerogatives	to	which	their	
                                                        
28 (Inness 1996, 90-2).  
29 (Inness 1996, 74-94). 
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members	may	lay	claim.30	Failing	to	respect	such	prerogatives	can,	at	least	in	some	cases,	constitute	a	problematic	breach	of	intimacy.	We	call	‘the	intimacy	account’	the	view	that	considerations	of	intimacy	ground	the	normative	importance	of	expressive	appropriation	claims.	A	full	treatment	of	this	issue	is	outside	the	scope	of	this	paper,	but	we	think	that	there	are	at	least	two	prima	facie	reasons	to	think	that	the	prerogatives	of	interpersonal	and	group	intimacy	have	normative	importance.	The	first	is	simply	that	meaningfulness	has	prima	facie	normative	importance.	If	an	agent	derives	meaning	from	a	relation	to	an	individual	or	group,	others	should	respect	the	agent’s	preferences	regarding	this	relation	unless	there	is	some	overriding	reason	not	to.	The	second	is	that	intimate	practices	are	important	loci	of	self-determination	for	both	individuals	and	groups,	such	that	respecting	the	prerogatives	of	intimacy	is	an	important	way	of	respecting	such	self-determination.31	To	be	clear,	we	stop	short	of	Inness’	claim	that	personal	intimacy	grounds	a	right	to	privacy;	we	make	no	parallel	claim	that	group	intimacy	can	ground	any	such	rights.	Furthermore,	we	do	not	think	that	the	prerogatives	of	intimacy	are	necessarily	overriding;	they	generate	pro	
tanto	normative	reasons,	the	ultimate	importance	of	which	depends	on	contextual	considerations.	For	instance,	suppose	an	atheist	attends	a	Catholic	church	as	a	tourist	and	the	priest	requests	that	only	Catholics	take	Holy	Communion.	If	the	atheist	takes	Communion	despite	this	request,	as	an	act	of	tourism	and	for	no	other	reason,	we	believe	his	action	constitutes	a	problematic	breach	of	intimacy.	On	the	other	hand,	it	might	be	ultimately	justifiable	for	a	comedian	to	poke	fun	at	the	intimate	practices	of	the	Catholic	Church,	since	such	satire	might	promote	worthwhile	aesthetic	or	socio-political	aims	that	generate	countervailing	reasons.			 Implicitly	or	explicitly,	all	of	the	anti-appropriation	arguments	discussed	in	section	1	depend	on	the	premise	that	oppressed	groups	deserve	special	consideration	with	respect	to	
                                                        
30 This is a different view from the one that Young considers at (Young 2010, 125-128), according to which 
appropriation is a violation of the individual privacy of group members. We mean to identify a prerogative 
analogous to privacy. We do not claim that appropriation in general can be considered a privacy violation.  
31 Inness directly relates autonomy to the right to privacy at (Inness 1996, 95-112).  
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appropriation.	The	wish	from	members	of	a	Native	American	tribe	that	outsiders	not	perform	the	tribe's	traditional	music	would	seem	to	hold	more	weight	(other	things	being	equal)	than	a	wish	from	Christians	that	a	secular	choral	group	not	perform	“A	Mighty	Fortress	is	Our	God.”	We	now	suggest	an	explanation	for	the	asymmetry:	oppression	is	exactly	the	sort	of	contextual	consideration	that	gives	the	prerogatives	of	intimacy	heightened	normative	importance.	If	a	group	is	socially	and	politically	marginalized,	it	becomes	especially	important	to	defer	to	the	group	in	matters	relating	to	its	practices	and	institutions,	to	afford	the	group	as	much	self-determination	as	possible.				 What	we	think	is	particularly	helpful	about	relating	cultural	appropriation	to	the	concept	of	group	intimacy	is	that	considerations	of	intimacy	help	to	explain	the	normative	importance	of	expressive	appropriation	claims.	On	our	analysis,	then,	expressive	appropriation	claims	can	be	understood	as	attempts	to	set	boundaries	concerning	a	group’s	intimate	practices.	Ignoring	an	appropriation	claim	of	this	sort	might	in	some	cases	constitute	a	breach	of	intimacy.	Consider	the	recent	debate	in	Brazil	concerning	the	appropriation	of	African	head	wraps	by	non-African	Brazilians.	Ana	Maria	Gonçalves	claims	in	The	Intercept	that	the	African	diaspora	has	left	many	Africans	living	in	Brazil	without	a	sense	of	belonging.32	She	writes,	“As	a	result	of	[the	diaspora],	we	are	who	we	are:	Beings	without	a	defined	belonging,	without	easily	traceable	roots,	who	are	no	longer	from	there	and	were	never	fully	planted	here.”	She	goes	on	to	argue	that	the	head	wrap	plays	an	important	role	in	grounding	a	sense	of	common	identity	among	members	of	the	African	diaspora,	and	suggests	that	this,	along	with	the	oppression	that	African	immigrants	face,	should	give	non-Africans	sufficient	reason	to	respect	the	appropriation	claims	of	Africans	regarding	the	head	wrap.	She	writes:		 	Wearing	a	head	wrap	is	a	form	of	belonging.	It	is	joining	with	another	member	of	the	diaspora	who	also	wears	in	a	head	wrap	and,	without	needing	to	say	anything,	know	that	he	or	she	knows	that	you	
                                                        
32 https://theintercept.com/2017/02/17/white-brazilians-dont-want-to-accept-their-racism-in-controversy-over-
african-head-wraps/ 
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know	that	the	head	wraps	on	our	heads	cost	and	continue	to	cost	our	lives.	To	know	that	our	precarious	housing	was	once	considered	illegal,	immoral,	abject.	In	order	to	carry	this	head	wrap	on	our	heads	we	had	to	hide,	pilfer,	disguise,	and	deny	it.	It	was	cover,	but	it	was	also	a	symbol	of	faith,	of	resistance,	of	union.	The	collective	head	wrap	that	we	inhabit	was	constantly	racialized,	disrespected,	invaded,	made	profane,	and	criminalized.	Where	were	you	when	all	of	this	was	happening?	You	who	now	want	to	kick	down	the	door	and	take	a	seat	on	the	living	room	sofa,	just	as	we	have	almost	been	able	to	restore	the	dignity	of	our	head	wraps.	Where	are	you	when	we	need	help	and	humanity	to	preserve	these	symbols?		Gonçalves’	appropriation	claim	makes	explicit	references	to	considerations	of	group	intimacy.	We	think	that	a	similar	pattern	of	justification	is	implicit	in	a	wide	range	of	claims.	Notice	the	similarities	of	this	case	to	the	cases	referenced	in	section	1	concerning	dreadlocks	and	war	bonnets.	In	all	three	cases,	members	of	an	oppressed	group	seek	to	set	a	boundary	by	asking	non-group	members	to	refrain	from	appropriating	a	stylistic	cultural	element	that	has	importance	for	each	group’s	identity.	Wearing	a	headdress	is	an	intimate	practice,	and	likewise	for	dreadlocks33	and	war	bonnets.34	We	can	now	see	more	clearly	what	some	find	so	objectionable	about	the	symbolism	of	these	forms	of	appropriation.	The	cultural	elements	being	appropriated	are	meaningful	to	group	members	because	of	the	roles	they	play	in	intimate	practices	that	unite	the	group.	The	expressive	appropriation	claims	many	group	members	have	made	against	these	forms	of	appropriation	are	attempts	to	exercise	prerogatives	of	group	intimacy.			 But,	crucially,	the	intimacy	account	does	not	yield	objective	determinations	about	who	can	participate	in	an	intimate	practice.	Intimacy	is	flexible	—	relations	of	intimacy	can	be	extended,	outsiders	can	be	granted	temporary	or	long-term	insider	status,	insiders	can	be	exiled,	and	boundaries	can	be	re-drawn.	Furthermore,	notice	the	order	of	operations	with	intimacy.	It	is	not	the	case	that	a	relationship	is	first	established	as	intimate,	and	only	then	can	the	participants	in	the	relationship	engage	in	intimate	acts.	Engaging	in	intimate	acts	is	what	constitutes	an	intimate	relationship.	Similarly,	we	suggest	that	acts	of	group	intimacy	are	not	necessarily	predicated	on	the	prior	existence	of	the	group.	Certainly,	pre-existing	groups	can	create	intimate	practices	and	bind	
                                                        
33 http://smithsonianeducation.org/migrations/rasta/rasessay.html 
34 http://nativeappropriations.com/2010/04/but-why-cant-i-wear-a-hipster-headdress.html  
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themselves	further	together	through	these	practices.	Consider,	for	example,	the	origins	of	African	American	culture.	Paul	Taylor	tells	the	story	of	a	group	of	slaves,	newly	arrived	in	the	Americas,	who	had,	during	the	long	voyage,	shaved	their	hair	into	the	patterns	of	stars	and	half-moon:		 The	uprooted	Africans	in	the	story	were	positioned	to	become	African	Americans	because	they	had	first	been	seen	as	treated	as	blacks.	They	put	stars	in	their	hair	in	response	to	this	forced	insertion	into	the	crucible	of	racialization…	Instead	of	entering	the	new	world	in	the	manner	of	the	mainly	thought	to	be,	unadorned,	unmarked	by	the	self-conscious	creation	of	meaning,	they	found	common	cause	in	the	essentially	human	act	of	aesthetic	self-fashioning.35			Individuals	were	thrown	together	by	violent	external	forces—effectively	forced	into	a	group—but	then,	through	engaging	in	intimate	practices,	developed	agency	with	respect	to	this	grouping.			 It	is	also	possible	for	individuals	who	previously	did	not	constitute	a	group	in	any	sense	to	coalesce	into	an	intimate	group	through	such	practices.	Intimate	groups	are	not	necessarily	united	by	any	essential	features	of	group	members,	nor	do	they	necessarily	fall	within	any	particular	lines	of	race,	class,	culture,	or	gender.	There	might	be	multi-racial,	multi-ethnic,	multi-cultural	intimate	groups	centered	on	practices	such	as	skateboarding,	Star	Wars	fandom,	and	the	like,	and	indeed	such	groups	can	(and	do)	issue	appropriation	claims	that	express	the	desire	to	protect	the	boundaries	surrounding	their	intimate	practices.	Intimate	groups	can	sometimes	self-constitute	
through	intimate	practices	–	they	can	come	into	existence	as	a	result	of	self-identification,	valuation,	and	mutual	engagement	through	intimate	practices.	In	cases	where	intimate	practices	are	created	within	pre-existing	groups,	these	practices	can	serve	to	maintain,	strengthen,	or	further	develop	the	group’s	identity.			 Many	intuitions	about	cultural	appropriation	are	better	and	more	fully	explained	by	the	intimacy	account	than	any	other	account.	Most	commentators	who	endorse	restrictive	normative	views	about	cultural	appropriation	hold	that	group	members	have	standing	to	make	appropriation	
                                                        
35 (Taylor 2016, 1-2). The theme of aesthetic self-fashioning and the creation of group agency is developed 
throughout the book.  
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claims	without	needing	to	offer	supporting	evidence.36	An	account	according	to	which	the	normative	weight	of	appropriation	claims	rests	entirely	on	independent	grounds	will	be	hard-pressed	to	explain	this	standing.	The	intimacy	account,	on	the	other	hand,	can	readily	explain	why	group	members	can	have	standing	to	issue	appropriation	claims	without	supporting	evidence.	It	is	the	prerogative	of	group	members	to	collectively	set	the	boundaries	concerning	their	intimate	practices.	Issuing	an	appropriation	claim	is	a	way	for	an	individual	to	make	their	stance	regarding	such	a	boundary	known,	to	seek	its	adoption	by	the	group	and	have	it	respected	by	outsiders.		 Consider	how	well	the	intimacy	account	captures	the	kinds	of	cultural	elements	that	are	most	often	the	objects	of	appropriation	claims.	Religious	rituals,	modes	of	dress,	traditions	of	food	preparation,	musical	styles	—	these	cultural	elements	play	a	central	role	in	binding	groups	together	and	generating	a	common	identity.	Consider,	by	way	of	contrast,	the	sorts	of	cultural	elements	that,	though	characteristic	and	perhaps	even	culturally	emblematic,	are	rarely	the	subject	of	appropriation	claims.	European	circular	traffic	design,	Chinese	agricultural	terracing,	and	Japanese	techniques	for	packaging	food	for	vending	machines	do	not	derive	their	value	from	community	connection;	all	have	been	borrowed	by	other	peoples	and	cultures	with	little	resistance	on	the	cultural	appropriation	front.		The	intimacy	account	offers	an	explanation:	these	cultural	elements	do	not	have	the	same	significance	with	respect	to	the	unity	and	identity	of	the	groups	that	innovated	them	as	hairstyles,	fashion,	or	food.	Traffic	design	and	agricultural	plans	are	not	usually	ways	for	group	members	to	express	affection	for,	membership	in,	or	a	sense	of	unity	with	the	group.		The	intimacy	account	echoes	accounts	of	the	variable	usability	of	ethnic	slurs	by	insiders	and	outsiders.	As	Luvell	Anderson	argues,	certain	racial	slurs	have	different	meaning	when	used	by	an	in-group	member	than	when	used	by	an	outsider.37	When	used	by	an	insider,	a	racial	slur	can	be	used	to	express	camaraderie,	as	a	value-neutral	descriptor,	or	as	a	form	of	mild	derogation.	But	
                                                        
36 See, for example, Adrienne Keene’s remarks quoted earlier. 
37 Anderson (forthcoming). 
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even	its	derogatory	use	here	is	entirely	different	from	the	derogatory	use	in	the	hands	of	a	racist.	The	distinction	between	these	uses,	says	Anderson,	is	best	explained	in	terms	of	communities	of	
practice	—	communities	organized	around	a	particular	endeavor.	We	take	the	intimacy	account	to	expand	upon	the	notion	of	a	community	of	practice,	since	it	explains	not	only	why	some	communities	of	practice	have	rightful	say	concerning	the	boundaries	of	some	of	their	practices,	but	also	explains	standard	intuitions	about	the	sorts	of	practices	where	such	boundaries	have	normative	importance.	The	American	Medical	Association	is	a	community	organized	around	the	practice	of	medicine,	but	this	practice	is	not	used	to	express	affection	and	solidarity	with	the	group,	and	thus	is	not	an	intimate	practice.			
Section	3:	Normative	implications	of	the	intimacy	account		 We	distinguished	in	section	1	between	independently	grounded	and	expressive	appropriation	claims.	We	have	now	provided	an	account	of	expressive	appropriation	claims	and	their	normative	force.	These	claims	express	the	wishes	of	group	members	concerning	the	boundaries	of	group	intimacy.	The	intimacy	account	can	explain	something	that	an	account	based	solely	on	harms	could	not:	the	standing	that	a	group	member	has	to	register	their	claim,	and	have	it	be	taken	seriously,	without	empirical	evidence.	Harm	arguments	are	subject	to	demands	for	empirical	evidence;	they	are	contestable.	But	the	prerogatives	of	intimacy	are	not.	When	someone	asks	that	you	not	repeat	what	they	said	in	a	dark	and	emotionally	naked	moment,	their	claim	as	to	the	intimate	nature	of	their	words	and	their	request	for	privacy	is	not	up	for	debate.	You	may	think	other	considerations	are	more	important	(perhaps	if	their	words	indicate	that	they	are	in	danger	and	you	need	to	tell	their	spouse)	–	but	these	considerations	do	not	bear	on	their	assertion	that	their	words	are	private,	and	that	it	would	be	a	breach	of	intimacy	for	you	to	repeat	them.	The	reasons	of	intimacy	can	be	defeated,	but	the	content	of	expressive	claims	is	not	normally	open	to	direct	contestation.	Thus,	the	intimacy	account	explains	how	group-members	can	have	the	standing	
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to	issue	appropriation	claims	without	incurring	an	obligation	to	litigate	questions	of	justification.			 This	account	has	a	variety	of	normative	implications	and	raises	a	number	of	difficult	questions.	We	have	already	discussed	problems	that	arise	for	universal	entitlement	–	that	is,	the	view	that	anybody	can	appropriate	any	style	for	any	reason.	The	intimacy	account	suggests	another	reason	to	reject	this	view:	it	utterly	discounts	the	normative	importance	of	group	intimacy.	But	the	intimacy	account	also	suggests	a	significant	rejoinder	to	universal	restrictiveness	–	the	view	that	cultural	appropriation	from	historically	oppressed	groups	is	impermissible.	As	part	of	respecting	the	prerogatives	of	interpersonal	intimacy,	we	must	respect	decisions	to	relax	or	waive	the	protections	of	privacy.	Love	letters	between	two	individuals	are	private,	but	a	couple	can	waive	the	protections	of	privacy	by	publishing	them.	A	couple	might	choose	to	publish	their	love	letters	for	a	variety	of	reasons,	perhaps	because	they	think	the	letters	are	aesthetically	worthwhile,	or	for	money	and	fame,	or	as	a	form	of	exhibitionism.	It	would	be	objectionably	paternalistic	for	an	outsider	to	try	to	prevent	them	from	publishing	their	letters	out	of	concern	for	their	privacy.	Similarly,	at	the	group	level,	respect	for	the	prerogatives	of	group	intimacy	entails	respecting	a	group’s	wishes,	whether	they	be	to	restrict	access	to	their	intimate	practices	or	open	them	up	for	wider	participation.	If	groups	have	the	prerogative	to	restrict	the	use	of	their	intimate	practices,	they	also	have	the	prerogative	to	proactively	spread	these	practices,	whether	they	wish	do	so	for	the	sake	of	money,	influence	or	simply	as	a	gift	to	the	world.			 The	intimacy	account	therefore	implies	that,	absent	clear	independent	grounds,	we	cannot	determine	whether	or	not	a	given	form	of	appropriation	is	objectionable	without	consulting	the	wishes	of	the	particular	group.	Whether	or	not	an	act	of	appropriation	constitutes	a	breach	of	intimacy	cannot	be	determined	from	its	external	features,	nor	can	it	be	inferred	from	parallels	with	other	cases.	Take,	for	instance,	a	member	of	an	ethnic	majority	who	wears	a	style	of	garment	traditionally	worn	by	an	ethnic	minority.	Whether	or	not	such	an	act	constitutes	a	breach	of	intimacy	will	depend	on	the	particular	decisions	and	declarations	of	the	relevant	group.	By	all	
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appearances,	the	vast	majority	of	individuals	for	whom	the	creation	and	display	of	the	war	bonnet	is	an	intimate	practice	actively	oppose	its	appropriation	as	a	fashion	accessory.	There	may	be	some	individuals	who	are	indifferent	to	the	issue,	but	there	do	not	appear	a	significant	number	who	are	actively	in	favor	of	this	form	of	appropriation.	But	the	same	is	not	necessarily	true	for	all	cases	where	a	member	of	the	ethnic	majority	wears	a	garment	appropriated	from	an	ethnic	minority.	It	could	happen,	for	instance,	that	Japanese	people	come	to	a	widespread	agreement	that	Westerners	should	be	actively	encouraged	to	appropriate	the	kimono.	If	this	were	the	case,	then	it	would	not	constitute	an	intimacy	breach	for	Westerners	to	wear	kimonos.	Whether	or	not	a	given	form	of	appropriation	constitutes	a	breach	of	intimacy	cannot	be	determined	independently	of	the	decisions,	wishes,	and	expressions	of	the	relevant	group.			 Thus,	for	an	outsider	to	declare	that	a	form	of	appropriation	is	objectionable	without	consulting	the	particular	group	being	appropriated	from,	is	for	that	outsider	to	presume	to	speak	for	an	intimate	group	of	which	they	are	not	a	part.	This	is	a	form	of	arrogation	of	voice,	and	–like	appropriation—it	can	constitute	a	serious	breach	of	intimacy.	Imagine	that	Jane,	a	French	person,	wears	a	garment	that	has	special	cultural	meaning	for	Vietnamese	people	to	a	concert	of	Vietnamese	music.	Eleanor,	another	French	person,	sees	an	Instagram	photo	of	Jane	at	that	concert,	and	writes	a	blog	post	criticizing	Jane	for	cultural	appropriation.	Suppose	that	neither	Jane	nor	Eleanor	has	investigated	Vietnamese	attitudes	about	the	use	of	traditional	dress	by	non-Vietnamese;	in	this	case	Jane	is	being	presumptuous	in	appropriating	an	intimate	practice.	If	it	turns	out	that	Vietnamese	are	widely	opposed	to	non-Vietnamese	wearing	the	garment,	then	her	appropriation	would	constitute	an	intimacy	breach.	But	Eleanor	has	committed	what	might	be	seen	as	another	type	of	intimacy	breach:	she	has	presumed	to	speak	for,	and	preemptively	decide	on	behalf	of,	a	group	that	she	is	not	a	part	of.	Such	defensive	measures	by	outsiders	may	be	justifiable	in	cases	where	a	community	has	spoken	with	something	that	approaches	a	unified	voice.	Outsiders	may	be	right	to	amplify	a	group’s	wish,	especially	when	that	group	has	been	subject	to	historical	
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oppression.	But	Eleanor	has	proceeded	without	attending	to	the	group’s	voice	at	all.	 		 Let’s	consider	a	slightly	subtler	case.	Suppose	that	Brady	is	a	well-meaning	white	person	sensitive	to	concerns	about	cultural	appropriation	who	reads	several	blog	posts	from	Vietnamese-Americans	complaining	that	the	existence	of	pho	restaurants	run	by	white	Americans	is	a	form	of	problematic	cultural	appropriation.	In	light	of	these	few	appropriation	claims,	Brady	tries	to	instigate	a	boycott	of	white-owned	Vietnamese	restaurants.	Here,	it	seems	plausible	to	think	that	Brady	has	also	committed	a	breach	of	intimacy.	He	has	acted	on	the	basis	of	a	very	limited	number	of	voices,	without	adequately	investigating	what	the	larger	group	thinks.	He	did	not	presume	to	speak	directly	for	the	group	in	the	way	that	Eleanor	did,	but	he	did	unilaterally	privilege	the	voices	of	a	limited	number	of	group	members.	Unlike	Eleanor,	Brady	attended	to	voices	from	within	the	group,	but	he	took	these	few	voices	to	express	the	wishes	of	the	group	as	a	whole,	effectively	appointing	himself	the	arbiter	of	what	might	be	a	disagreement	internal	to	the	group.	Brady’s	taking	up	of	the	role	of	arbiter	might	be	seen	by	the	group	as	a	breach	of	intimacy.	This	is	not	to	say	that	Brady	shouldn’t	amplify	the	relevant	voices.	It’s	one	thing	to	broadcast	that	there	are	Vietnamese	people	who	are	opposed	to	white-owned	Vietnamese	restaurants,	but	it	is	quite	another	to	take	measures	to	enforce	that	preference	without	regard	to	the	attitudes	of	the	rest	of	the	group.		If	the	boundaries	of	a	group’s	intimacy	are	set	expressively,	only	members	of	that	group	can	set	them.	When	outsiders	attempt	to	set	boundaries	for	intimate	groups	they	do	not	belong	to,	they	engage	in	a	kind	of	intimacy	breach:	presuming	to	speak	for	an	intimate	group	that	one	is	not	a	member	of.	This	applies	whether	the	outsiders	are	arguing	for	a	policy	like	that	of	universal	entitlement	(which	totally	disregards	the	boundaries	of	intimacy)	or	universal	restrictiveness	(which	foists	boundaries	upon	groups	irrespective	of	their	wishes).	The	intimacy	account	prescribes	that	we	should	listen	to	each	particular	group	and	take	account	of	its	wishes,	whether	
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they	are	restrictive	or	permissive.	We	hold	that	an	appropriate	normative	outlook	regarding	cultural	appropriation	must	be	attentive	to	the	particular	wishes	of	particular	groups.			
Section	4.	Group	boundaries	and	group	speech	
	 This	brings	us	to	the	most	difficult	questions	that	the	intimacy	account	faces:	how	do	we	ascertain	what	the	right	group	is	to	listen	to,	and	how	do	we	ascertain	what	such	a	group’s	collective	wishes	really	are?	We	have	skirted	around	these	issues	until	this	point,	but	we	must	now	complicate	the	picture.	Much	excellent	work	has	been	done	recently	on	how	some	sorts	of	groups	might	decide	things	jointly	and	speak	as	a	collective	entity.38	The	technical	term	for	a	collection	of	people	that	together	possess	a	form	of	agency	is	‘group	agent’.	A	group	agent,	in	Philip	Pettit	and	Christian	List’s	influential	account,	is	a	group	of	people	sufficiently	organized	to	have	group-level	representations	and	motivations,	and	which	has	the	capacity	to	process	them	and	act	on	their	basis.	Group	agents	have	systems	in	place	by	which	the	mass	of	individual	voices,	opinions,	and	decisions	that	issue	from	members	of	the	group	can	be	systematically	processed	into	a	singular	voice.	Such	systems	include	voting	procedures,	decision	hierarchies,	and	the	like.	The	clearest	examples	of	group	agents	are	group	institutions	with	robust	organizational	and	normative	structure:	governments,	corporations,	and	professional	organizations.	The	beliefs	and	decisions	we	attribute	to	the	whole	group	are	not	simply	reducible	to	the	beliefs	and	decisions	of	the	majority	of	group	members.	For	example,	the	American	Medical	Association	is	surely	a	group	agent:	it	makes	decisions,	gives	pronouncements,	and	we	can	praise	it	for	its	good	decisions	and	hold	it	responsible	for	epistemic	and	moral	errors.	A	particular	belief	or	decision	gets	to	count	as	the	group’s	belief	or	decision	if	and	only	if	it	is	processed	in	the	right	way,	according	to	the	rules	of	the	organization:	it	
                                                        
38(Rovane 2004; Toumela 2007; List 2011; Gilbert 2013; Pettit 2014a; Pettit 2014; Rovane 2014; Lackey 2017) is a 
very brief sampling of this extended literature. We have, for brevity’s sake, focused on Pettit and List’s account, but 
our comments are compatible with any of these accounts. (Tollefsen 2015) is a particularly good recent overview of 
the literature. 
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must,	for	instance,	be	raised	at	a	designated	assembly	in	front	of	the	properly	selected	delegates,	discussed	through	defined	procedures	and	then	voted	on.	By	such	means,	the	AMA	has	issued	pronouncements	about,	e.g.,	the	effectiveness	of	vaccines.	These	pronouncements	report	the	beliefs	of	the	group.	But	there	are	surely	many	beliefs	that	most	or	all	members	of	the	AMA	hold	which	do	not	count	as	beliefs	of	the	AMA.	For	example:	most	AMA	members	presumably	believe	that	climate	change	is	real,	but	since	that	belief	has	not	passed	through	the	decision-making	procedures	of	the	group,	it	does	not	count	as	a	belief	of	the	AMA	and	it	cannot	be	attributed	to	the	AMA,	nor	can	the	AMA	be	held	responsible	for	it.	We	have	proposed	that	intimate	groups	are	constituted	when	a	set	of	individuals	engage	in	intimate	practices	that	express	or	give	rise	to	a	sense	of	common	identity	and	group	unity.	But	this	proposal	does	not	entail	that	intimate	groups	will	meet	the	conditions	for	counting	as	group	agents.	Certainly,	an	intimate	group	could	also	be	a	group	agent.	Some	Native	American	tribes,	for	example,	might	be	intimate	groups	that	also	qualify	as	robust	group	agents,	since	they	are	organized	by	a	system	of	governance.	In	cases	such	as	this,	there	may	be	a	straightforward	way	to	discover	the	group’s	wishes.	But	surely	many	intimate	groups	do	not	qualify	as	group	agents.	They	lack	the	requisite	organizational	structure.	Some	groups	may	have	intimate	practices	that	express	group	solidarity,	but	nothing	like	a	robust	procedure	for	arriving	at	group	decisions.	Let’s	call	such	groups	
sub-agential.	Many	intimate	groups	are	sub-agential.	Such	groups	may	have	some	animating	basis	for	cohesion,	but	they	are	not	group	agents	in	the	strict	sense.39		These	considerations	lead	to	a	number	of	difficulties.	The	first	is	what	we	might	call	the	
boundary	problem:	the	problem	of	how	to	determine	the	boundaries	of	a	group.	A	version	of	this	problem	has	been	explored	at	length	by	Erich	Matthes.40	The	topics	of	cultural	appropriation	and	
                                                        
39 For those interested theoretical account of such an animating basis from the literature on groups, likely candidates 
include Bryce Huebner and Marcus Hedahl’s notion of a shared interest and Margaret Gilbert’s account of joint 
commitment, both of which might plausibly ground prescriptions for behavior towards the group, but neither of 
which requires sufficient structure for group-hood to guarantee a singular voice (Huebner and Hedahl forthcoming; 
Gilbert 2013). 
40 (Matthes 2016). 
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group	intimacy	make	the	boundary	problem	particularly	salient,	because	in	many	cases	what’s	at	issue	is	precisely	membership	in	some	group.	Consider	the	case	of	the	poser.	The	poser	identifies	with	outlaw	biker	culture,	has	motorcycle-themed	tattoos,	and	wears	a	leather	jacket	under	a	sleeveless	denim	vest	with	a	skull	and	crossbones	patch	on	the	back,	but	does	not	and	never	has	ridden	a	motorcycle.	The	intimate	group	of	outlaw	bikers	objects	to	the	poser’s	appropriation	of	biker	culture,	but	the	poser	insists	that	they	self-identify	as	a	biker	and	therefore	are	entitled	to	participate	in	biker	practices.	What’s	being	contested	isn’t	whether	or	not	some	established	group	has	given	the	poser	permission	to	participate	in	an	intimate	practice.	Rather,	what’s	being	contested	is	who	gets	to	be	a	member	of	the	deciding	group	in	the	first	place.	We	think	that	intimate	groups	should	have	the	prerogative	to	set	their	own	boundaries,	but	this	creates	a	circularity:	in	order	to	set	the	boundaries	of	a	group,	the	group	members	need	to	arrive	at	a	decision;	but	in	order	to	identify	which	people	have	legitimate	standing	to	participate	in	this	decision,	we	need	to	know	where	the	boundaries	are.		This	problem	won’t	exist	if	an	intimate	practice	is	created	within	some	pre-existing	group	with	boundaries	drawn	on	some	independent	basis.	But	the	boundary	problem	seems	a	significant	one	in	the	case	of	groups	that	self-constitute	through	intimate	practices.	This	problem	is	genuinely	difficult,	and	the	difficulty	sheds	light	on	an	area	which	demands	further	investigation.	Much	of	the	work	on	the	nature	of	groups	and	group	agents	has	been	directed	towards	explicitly	defined	groups	with	clear	boundaries	–	corporations,	nations,	and	short-term	actively	cooperating	teams.	Relatively	little	has	been	done	to	investigate,	for	example,	how	we	are	to	determine	the	boundaries	of	a	sub-agential	group	without	objective	membership	conditions,	such	as	the	groups	that	constitute	various	types	of	communities.	We	hope	that	our	work	here	encourages	further	inquiry	into	these	issues.			 This	brings	us	to	the	second	major	difficulty	that	the	intimacy	account	faces:	even	assuming	that	we	can	settle	the	question	of	a	group’s	membership,	how	could	a	sub-agential	group	issue	
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group-level	decisions	about	the	boundaries	of	the	group’s	intimate	practices?	The	intimacy	of	a	group	grounds	certain	prerogatives	for	the	group,	but	if	an	intimate	group	is	sub-agential	it	has	no	procedure	for	issuing	group	decisions	about	how	to	exercise	these	prerogatives.	Again,	a	group	that	meets	the	robust	standards	for	group	agency	can	“speak”	in	a	straightforward	sense.	But	our	claim	is	that	it	is	possible	for	there	to	be	a	less	strictly	organized,	more	inchoate	sort	of	group,	such	that	the	group’s	intimate	practices	could	ground	prescriptions	for	outsiders,	but	which	does	not	have	the	right	kind	of	organizational	structure	to	make	clear	pronouncements	about	its	wishes.41		This	puts	the	well-meaning	outsider	in	a	difficult	position:	how	does	one	respect	the	wishes	of	a	sub-agential	group?	We	suspect	the	difficulty	of	this	position	has	led	many	such	well-meaning	outsiders	to	opt	for	the	easy	heuristic	of	universal	restrictiveness,	but	we	think	this	is	a	mistake.	Universal	restrictiveness	offers	a	clear	guide	to	action,	but	does	so	at	the	expense	of	adequately	respecting	the	prerogative	of	intimate	groups	to	open	their	practices	to	outsiders.	A	difficult	problem	emerges	when	we	consider	how	to	assess	the	wishes	of	a	sub-agential	group:	call	it	the	problem	of	runaway	defaults.	A	well-meaning	outsider	might	reason	in	the	following	way:	first,	one	ought	to	err	on	the	side	of	caution	by	deferring	to	appropriation	claims	by	default.	Second,	this	stance	should	only	be	relaxed	when	the	group	has	given	its	univocal	permission.	Third,	such	univocal	permissions	are	rarely	or	never	generated	by	sub-agential	intimate	groups.	Therefore,	the	default	stance	of	claim	deference	will	rarely	(if	ever)	be	relaxed	for	such	groups.	This	leads	to	an	objectionable	result	–	even	in	cases	where	an	overwhelming	majority	of	group	members	have	expressed	their	desire	to	encourage	a	particular	form	of	appropriation,	our	well-meaning	outsider	will	still	refuse	to	accept	their	preference.	The	problem	here	is	that	the	well-meaning	outsider	has	applied	an	inappropriately	strict	standard.	A	sub-agential	group	is	not	set	up	to	issue	univocal	permissions,	and	we	therefore	should	not	seek	such	permissions.		
                                                        
41 For example, Jennifer Lackey’s study of group assertion largely focuses on groups which are sufficiently 
organized as to officially designate an authorized spokesperson (Lackey 2017).  
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The	problem	may	become	clearer	if	we	consider	the	inverse	case.	Imagine	another	individual	–	an	optimistic	permission	seeker	–	who	reasons	in	the	following	way:	first,	one	ought	to	let	a	group	decide	for	itself	whether	or	not	outsiders	may	appropriate	from	that	group.	Second,	with	very	few	exceptions,	groups	cannot	arrive	at	univocal	decisions	about	whether	or	not	outsiders	may	appropriate	from	them.	Third,	absent	a	univocal	decision,	it	would	be	arrogation	of	voice	to	infer	that	a	group	does	not	want	outsiders	to	appropriate	from	them.	Therefore,	with	the	exception	of	rare	cases	where	a	group	issues	a	univocal	decision,	one	may	appropriate	whatever	one	wishes.	The	optimistic	permission	seeker	makes	the	same	basic	mistake	as	the	well-meaning	outsider:	applying	an	inappropriately	strict	standard	to	a	sub-agential	group.	In	both	cases,	the	standard	employed	is	nearly	impossible	to	meet;	thus,	whatever	one	takes	as	the	default	prescription	will	turn	out	to	be	unimpeachable,	for	all	practical	purposes.		While	sub-agential	groups	are	not	set	up	to	issue	univocal	decisions,	they	can	still	approximate	such	decisions.	We	propose	that	a	sub-agential	group	approximates	a	univocal	decision	when	a	considerable	number	of	group	members	voice	such	a	decision	and	there	is	an	insignificant	amount	of	dissent	from	within	the	group.	In	many	cases,	sub-agential	groups	will	not	meet	this	standard	for	approximating	a	univocal	decision.	In	these	cases,	it	may	be	very	hard	to	figure	out	what	to	do.	Both	horns	of	the	dilemma	might	be	uncomfortable	and	fraught	with	normative	peril.	This	should	be	unsurprising,	given	the	complexity	of	social	life	and	the	degree	of	oppression	and	injustice	that	pervades	the	world	today,	not	to	mention	the	inherent	difficulty	of	assessing	the	wishes	of	sub-agential	groups.	In	fact,	we	ought	to	be	suspicious	of	theories	that	purport	to	offer	an	easy	way	out	of	this	obvious	tangle.	The	issue	of	cultural	appropriation	is	difficult,	and	it	serves	no	one	to	bury	that	difficulty	with	blanket	presumptions.			Easy	heuristics	establish	clear	guides	to	action	at	the	expense	of	genuine	respect	for	the	intimacy	of	groups.	In	many	cases	the	wishes	of	a	group	are	indeterminate.	In	such	cases,	respect	for	group	intimacy	entails	attending	to	and	respecting	this	indeterminacy.	When	an	intimate	couple	
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disagrees	with	one	another,	outsiders	breach	their	intimacy	by	inserting	themselves	into	the	debate.	We	hold	that	the	same	is	true	in	the	case	of	group	intimacy.	In	many	cases,	when	a	group	has	not	approximated	the	expression	of	a	univocal	wish,	the	intimacy	account	may	not	yield	a	clear	and	settled	course	of	action.	But	this	reflects	the	genuinely	unsettled	state	of	the	group’s	wishes.	It	is	crucial,	in	respecting	the	intimacy	of	a	group,	to	respect	even	the	fact	that	its	wishes	have	not	yet	settled.	Deciding	on	a	course	of	action	in	such	cases	may	be	unavoidably	uncomfortable.	An	outsider	may	receive	an	invitation	from	a	group	member	to	participate	in	a	practice	and	know	in	advance	that	other	group	members	will	resent	their	presence.	Or	an	outsider	might	receive	an	item	of	clothing	or	jewelry	as	a	gift	from	a	group	member	that	they	are	hesitant	to	wear	because	of	appropriation	concerns.	There	may	be	no	comfortable	solution.	A	strict	default	would	make	the	decision	easier,	but	at	the	expense	of	genuinely	respecting	the	intimacy	of	groups.				
Postscript:	a	rejoinder	to	Matthes			 We	greatly	appreciate	Erich	Hatala	Matthes’	clear	and	astute	response	to	our	piece.42	He	offers	an	alternative	account	of	the	normativity	of	cultural	appropriation,	according	to	which	cultural	appropriation	is	wrong	when	it	exacerbates	and/or	manifests	oppression.	We	would	like	to	briefly	sketch	our	response.			 Matthes’	oppression	account	has	two	parts:	appropriation	can	be	wrong	if	it	exacerbates	oppression	or	if	it	manifests	oppression.	Exacerbating	oppression	is	a	clear-cut	harm,	and	our	account	already	recognizes	that	appropriation	can	be	wrong	in	cases	where	it	is	harmful.	However,	as	we	have	noted,	such	harms	may	be	difficult	to	demonstrate,	and	appropriation	claims	are	often	made	in	the	absence	of	demonstrable	harm.		Our	analyses	diverge	over	cases	in	which	appropriation	is	seen	as	manifesting	oppression.	First,	“manifesting	oppression”	seems	too	broad	a	characterization.	Members	of	dominant	groups	manifest	oppression	in	a	variety	of	ways	throughout	
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their	lives	(e.g.,	accepting	deferential	treatment	from	law	enforcement	and	desirable	employment	opportunities).	The	wrong	Matthes	is	pointing	to	must	be	more	distinct	than	this.	This	emerges	when	he	characterizes	the	wrong	in	question	as	exploitation	rather	than	as	a	mere	manifestation	of	oppression.	An	instance	of	appropriation	can	be	seen	as	exploitative	when	it	is	perceived	as	taking	advantage	of	oppressive	power	relations	to	benefit	members	of	a	dominant	group	without	regard	for	the	interests	of	the	oppressed	group.	But	whether	or	not	an	instance	of	appropriation	is	exploitative	is	a	matter	of	interpretation	that	should	be	decided	by	the	group	in	question.	As	we	argue	in	section	1,	David	Bowie’s	appropriation	could	be	seen	as	exploitative,	but	could	instead	be	seen	as	a	mutually	beneficial	cultural	exchange.	Matthes	suggests	that	the	oppression	account	has	an	easier	time	coping	with	the	boundary	problem	than	the	intimacy	account	does,	because	his	account	entails	the	normative	status	of	appropriation	depends	on	facts	about	oppression	that	come	apart	from	the	issue	of	group	membership.	But	here	he	faces	a	dilemma.	If	he	admits	that	the	group	should	get	to	decide	what	counts	as	exploitative,	his	account	fails	to	evade	the	boundary	problem,	since	this	principle	presupposes	that	there	is	some	way	to	distinguish	group	members	from	non-members	(note	that	he	freely	employs	the	language	of	‘insiders’	and	‘outsiders’).	If	he	denies	that	the	group	should	get	to	decide	this,	his	picture	seems	paternalistic.	Who	should	have	standing	to	determine	whether	or	not	a	form	of	appropriation	is	exploitative	if	not	the	group	in	question?			 The	central	issue	here	concerns	the	grounds	for	the	normativity	of	cultural	appropriation.	Matthes	claims	that	the	primary	ground	is	oppression,	while	we	endorse	a	pluralistic	account	according	to	which	in	many	cases,	group	intimacy	is	the	primary	ground.	Matthes	objects	to	our	account	by	pointing	out	that	there	are	some	groups	for	which	intimacy	does	not	seem	to	generate	even	weak	normative	reasons,	such	as	the	KKK.	The	KKK	is,	crucially,	a	group	of	which	we	heartily	disapprove.	We	agree	that	the	intimacy	of	the	KKK	ultimately	has	no	normative	pull,	but	we	think	this	is	because	considerations	of	group	intimacy	for	the	KKK	are	drastically	outweighed	by	other	considerations	–	in	particular,	the	KKK’s	moral	contemptibility.	To	adjudicate	between	our	
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competing	accounts,	we	should	instead	consider	neutral	cases.	Does	an	intimate	group,	which	is	neither	oppressed	nor	morally	contemptible,	have	standing	to	make	expressive	appropriation	claims	with	normative	weight?	Imagine	a	long-standing,	morally	decent	group	that	has	neither	been	oppressed	nor	advantaged	by	oppression.	Suppose	this	group	has	a	ceremonial	dance	used	to	express	group	solidarity	and	many	insiders	speak	out	to	say	that	this	dance	is	deeply	meaningful	to	the	group	and	they	urgently	request	that	outsiders	not	appropriate	it,	while	no	insiders	speak	up	to	oppose	this	stance.	We	think	that	the	fact	that	group	members	find	the	dance	meaningful	and	make	this	request	on	the	basis	of	its	meaningfulness	generates	a	reason	for	outsiders	not	to	appropriate	it.	This	reason	could	be	outweighed	(perhaps	very	easily),	but	we	think	that	ordinary	intuitions	about	the	normative	importance	of	meaningfulness	and	self-determination	strongly	support	the	claim	that	the	group’s	wishes	should	have	some	normative	weight.				 Moreover,	the	oppression	account	is	unable	to	explain	the	difference	between	the	kinds	of	practices	that	are	typically	subject	to	appropriation	claims	and	those	that	are	not.	Appropriation	discourse	tends	to	concern	hairstyles,	music,	and	dance	rituals,	but	not	urban	design	solutions,	farming	techniques,	medical	practices,	or	packaging	techniques,	even	though	many	such	practices	are	innovations	of	oppressed	groups.	The	intimacy	account	offers	an	explanation	for	this	divergence:	practices	that	tend	to	come	up	for	appropriation	claims	are	the	ones	that	function	to	embody	or	promote	a	sense	of	common	identity	and	group	connection	among	participants	in	the	practice.	The	oppression	account	does	not	explain	why	it	is	considered	objectionable	to	borrow	hairstyles	from	oppressed	groups,	but	not	to	borrow	farming	or	medical	practices.	Moreover,	the	oppression	account	seems	to	recommend	deferring	to	oppressed	people	in	any	way	that	would	function	to	materially	and	symbolically	undermine	oppression.	But	no	one	advocates	for	deferring	to	oppressed	groups	with	regard	to,	for	example,	driving	practices	(perhaps	by	designating	a	
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special	lane	for	members	of	oppressed	groups).	The	intimacy	account	is	better	equipped	than	the	oppression	account	to	explain	the	limited	scope	of	calls	for	deference	towards	oppressed	people.43				 	
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